Pensées — Blaise Pascal

Pensées

Blaise Pascal · Licença: Public domain · Fonte

• _To transpose after the laws to the following title._ SECTION II · ¶248
• A letter _On the Foolishness of Human Knowledge and Philosophy_. SECTION II · ¶253
• This letter before _Diversion_. SECTION II · ¶254
• _Felix qui potuit ... Nihil admirari._[42] SECTION II · ¶255
• 280 kinds of sovereign good in Montaigne.[43] SECTION II · ¶256
• To write against those who made too profound a study of science: Descartes. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶26
• I cannot forgive Descartes. In all his philosophy he would have been quite willing to dispense with God. But he had to make Him give a fillip to set the world in motion; beyond this, he has no further need of God. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶26
• Descartes useless and uncertain. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶26
• How comes it that a cripple does not offend us, but that a fool does?[45] Because a cripple recognises that we walk straight, whereas a fool declares that it is we who are silly; if it were not so, we should feel pity and not anger. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶26
• It is natural for the mind to believe, and for the will to love;[47] so that, for want of true objects, they must attach themselves to false. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶27
• I do not speak of fools, I speak of the wisest men; and it is among them that the imagination has the great gift of persuasion. Reason protests in vain; it cannot set a true value on things. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶27
• What but this faculty of imagination dispenses reputation, awards respect and veneration to persons, works, laws, and the great? How insufficient are all the riches of the earth without her consent! Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶27
• If the greatest philosopher in the world find himself upon a plank wider than actually necessary, but hanging over a precipice, his imagination will prevail, though his reason convince him of his safety.[49] Many cannot bear the thought without a cold sweat. I will not state all its effects. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶27
• Every one knows that the sight of cats or rats, the crushing of a coal, etc. may unhinge the reason. The tone of voice affects the wisest, and changes the force of a discourse or a poem. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶27
• Love or hate alters the aspect of justice. How much greater confidence has an advocate, retained with a large fee, in the justice of his cause! How much better does his bold manner make his case appear to the judges, deceived as they are by appearances! How ludicrous is reason, blown with a breath in every direction! Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶28
• We have another source of error in diseases.[52] They spoil the judgment and the senses; and if the more serious produce a sensible change, I do not doubt that slighter ills produce a proportionate impression. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶28
• Justice and truth are two such subtle points, that our tools are too blunt to touch them accurately. If they reach the point, they either crush it, or lean all round, more on the false than on the true. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶28
• But besides those errors which arise accidentally and through lack of intelligence, with these heterogeneous faculties ... Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶29
• The imagination enlarges little objects so as to fill our souls with a fantastic estimate; and, with rash insolence, it belittles the great to its own measure, as when talking of God. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶29
• Things which have most hold on us, as the concealment of our few possessions, are often a mere nothing. It is a nothing which our imagination magnifies into a mountain. Another turn of the imagination would make us discover this without difficulty. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶29
• _Næ iste magno conatu magnas nugas dixerit.[54] Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶30
• Quasi quidquam infelicius sit homini cui sua figmenta dominantur._[55] (Plin.) Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶30
• Custom is our nature. He who is accustomed to the faith believes in it, can no longer fear hell, and believes in nothing else. He who is accustomed to believe that the king is terrible ... etc. Who doubts then that our soul, being accustomed to see number, space, motion, believes that and nothing else? Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶30
• _Quod crebro videt non miratur, etiamsi cur fiat nescit; quod ante non viderit, id si evenerit, ostentum esse censet._[56] (Cic. 583.) Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶30
• _Spongia solis._[57]--When we see the same effect always recur, we infer a natural necessity in it, as that there will be a to-morrow, etc. But nature often deceives us, and does not subject herself to her own rules. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶31
• Parents fear lest the natural love of their children may fade away. What kind of nature is that which is subject to decay? Custom is a second nature which destroys the former.[58] But what is nature? For is custom not natural? I am much afraid that nature is itself only a first custom, as custom is a second nature. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶31
• The nature of man is wholly natural, _omne animal_.[59] Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶31
• There is nothing he may not make natural; there is nothing natural he may not lose. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶31
• Memory, joy, are intuitions; and even mathematical propositions become intuitions, for education produces natural intuitions, and natural intuitions are erased by education. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶31
• When we are accustomed to use bad reasons for proving natural effects, we are not willing to receive good reasons when they are discovered. An example may be given from the circulation of the blood as a reason why the vein swells below the ligature. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶32
• _Bias leading to error._--It is a deplorable thing to see all men deliberating on means alone, and not on the end. Each thinks how he will acquit himself in his condition; but as for the choice of condition, or of country, chance gives them to us. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶32
• It is a pitiable thing to see so many Turks, heretics, and infidels follow the way of their fathers for the sole reason that each has been imbued with the prejudice that it is the best. And that fixes for each man his conditions of locksmith, soldier, etc. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶32
• Hence savages care nothing for Providence.[60] Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶32
• There is an universal and essential difference between the actions of the will and all other actions. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶32
• How unjust and unreasonable is the heart of man, which feels it disagreeable to be obliged to do in regard to one man what in some measure it were right to do to all men! For is it right that we should deceive men? Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶33
• Hence it happens that if any have some interest in being loved by us, they are averse to render us a service which they know to be disagreeable. They treat us as we wish to be treated. We hate the truth, and they hide it from us. We desire flattery, and they flatter us. We like to be deceived, and they deceive us. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶33
• Man is then only disguise, falsehood, and hypocrisy, both in himself and in regard to others. He does not wish any one to tell him the truth; he avoids telling it to others, and all these dispositions, so removed from justice and reason, have a natural root in his heart. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶34
• I set it down as a fact that if all men knew what each said of the other, there would not be four friends in the world. This is apparent from the quarrels which arise from the indiscreet tales told from time to time. [I say, further, all men would be ...] Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶34
• Some vices only lay hold of us by means of others, and these, like branches, fall on removal of the trunk. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶34
• When our passion leads us to do something, we forget our duty; for example, we like a book and read it, when we ought to be doing something else. Now, to remind ourselves of our duty, we must set ourselves a task we dislike; we then plead that we have something else to do, and by this means remember our duty. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44] · ¶34

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